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Grounding Entails Counterpossible Non-Triviality 
Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
Alastair Wilson 
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3rd April 2016 
Abstract: This paper outlines a non-reductive counterfactual account of 
grounding along interventionist lines, and uses the account to argue that 
taking grounding seriously requires ascribing non-trivial truth-conditions to a 
range of counterpossible counterfactuals. This result allows for a diagnosis of 
a route to scepticism about grounding, as deriving at least in part from 
scepticism about non-trivial counterpossible truth and falsity. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 It is part of the folklore of contemporary metaphysics that grounding goes 
beyond any purely modal connection such as one-way supervenience (Bennett & 
McLaughlin 2005). Many of the classic examples that underwrite this folklore are due 
to Kit Fine (e.g. Fine 2001). Necessarily, Singleton Socrates exists iff Socrates does; 
so no two worlds can differ with respect to whether Singleton Socrates exists without 
differing with respect to whether Socrates exists, and vice versa. Thus there is two-
way supervenience between the existence of Socrates and the existence of Singleton 
Socrates. If the latter is grounded in the former without the former being grounded 
in the latter, as intuition suggests, then grounding is not one-way supervenience. 
 
 There is more, though, to our ordinary modal thought than one-way 
supervenience. Counterfactuals offer a promising route to getting a handle on the 
notion of grounding, and this paper outlines a non-reductive counterfactual account 
of grounding. Accepting non-trivial counterpossibles opens the way for 
counterfactual-based treatments of the difficult cases that sank the one-way 
supervenience analysis of grounding. Although grounding cannot be characterized in 
terms of necessitated material conditionals (strict conditionals) as in the 
supervenience approach, it can be characterized in terms of distinctive patterns of 
counterfactual conditionals. This approach, inspired by recent interventionist 
theories of causation, retains some of the spirit of the supervenience analysis: the 
ideological resources to which the approach appeals are just those of our ordinary 
counterfactual thinking, allowed to range beyond the limits of the possible. 
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 The interventionist approach to grounding is described in §2 and applied to some 
examples in §3. The core of the paper is §4, in which I argue that modelling the 
structure of grounding cases requires ascribing non-trivial truth-conditions to a range 
of counterpossible interventionist counterfactuals. §5 connects the discussion to the 
recent debate over the (non-)triviality of counterpossibles, and §6 is a conclusion. 
 
2. Interventionism about Grounding 
Grounding and causation appear to have a lot in common. Their surface 
similarities—for example, our use of ‘because’ in connection with both notions—are 
obvious, but the commonality between the notions can potentially be traced deeper.1 
Here is a brief but illustrative list of their shared features. The relations of (strict) 
grounding and causation are both ordinarily thought to form partial orders; however, 
transitivity and anti-symmetry can be challenged for each notion by appeal to 
analogous types of cases, and structurally similar responses are available to these 
challenges. Likewise, structurally similar puzzle cases challenge counterfactual 
analyses for the two notions. Grounds and causes can both be informatively cited in 
explanations, and they stand in similar relations to laws, necessity and inference. The 
analogy with sufficient cause is often used to introduce the notion of full ground. 
Finally, and more elusively, both grounding and causation seem ʻspookyʼ in a way 
that troubles austere empiricists.  
 
The apparently systematic analogy between grounding and causation suggests 
that we might look to our well-developed menu of theories of causation—
counterfactual theories, process theories, agential theories, and the like—in 
understanding the notion of grounding. This way of proceeding allows us to remain 
neutral about the basis for the grounding-causation analogy. Perhaps the two notions 
are analogous because they are species of some common genus of determination 
relation (Schaffer forthcoming, Bennett forthcoming), or perhaps they are analogous 
because grounding is a type of causation (A. Wilson MS), or perhaps there is no 
further explanation to be given for the analogy between them (Fine 2012). For 
present purposes, we can set this issue aside. To the extent that grounding and 
causation are similar to one another, similar theoretical tools ought to be useful for 
understanding them.2 
                                                 
1 The analogy between grounding and causation has recently been mapped out in detail by 
Schaffer (forthcoming) and by A. Wilson (MS). 
2 To be precise, I will be assuming that causation and grounding are analogous at least with 
respect to their relationship with counterfactuals. My argument is compatible with the 
notions being disanalogous in various other respects: for example, in respect of their relation 
to energy-momentum transfer or in respect of our epistemic access to their instances. 
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I will focus on the interventionist approach to causation, associated especially 
with Woodward (2003), Hitchcock (2001), and Pearl (2009). Interventionism does 
not comprise a straightforward reduction of causation to counterfactual dependence. 
Nonetheless, it is still a form of counterfactual theory since it involves a non-trivial 
ʻsystematic connection between causal claims and certain counterfactualsʼ 
(Woodward 2003, p.70). My strategy will be to chart a similarly systematic 
connection between grounding claims and their corresponding counterfactuals. 
 
As with David Lewisʼs original counterfactual theory of causation (Lewis 1973b), 
interventionists focus on a restricted range of counterfactuals in order to avoid 
spurious causal dependencies arising from what Lewis calls back-tracking 
counterfactuals (Lewis 1973a, 1979/1986). To encode the distinction between back-
trackers and non-back-trackers, interventionists make use of causal models consisting 
of a set of variables, a set of structural equations relating the variables, and an 
assignment of actual values to the variables. According to my interpretation of 
interventionism, the difference between back-tracking and non-back-tracking 
counterfactuals is derived from a more basic distinction between inappropriate and 
appropriate models. Non-back-tracking counterfactuals are those with an antecedent 
specifying an intervention on some variables in an appropriate model, and with a 
consequent specifying some values for other variables in that model. Interventionists 
offer no independent characterization of appropriateness; an appropriate model is 
just one which correctly captures the causal structure of the situation modelled. 
 
We may reasonably ask what is being taken as primitive by interventionists—are 
the truth-conditions for interventionist counterfactuals specified in terms of 
metaphysically prior causal relations between variables in a causal model, or are the 
causal models instead reducible to primitively true interventionist counterfactuals? 
Woodward (2003) offers interventionism as a non-reductive analysis—as exposing a 
bi-directional relationship of conceptual interdependence with no priority running 
either way. I propose to think of the interventionist proposal somewhat differently, 
as remaining non-committal between alternative directions of explanation. The 
interventionist framework can be used to reduce causation to counterfactuals, or to 
specify truth-conditions for an interesting class of counterfactuals in causal-theoretic 
terms, or to articulate a two-way interdependence. My use of the framework will be 
neutral between these approaches, since the arguments that follow require only a 
connection between causation and counterfactuals that holds under all three 
interpretations. By taking this line, interventionists can exploit the connection 
between causation and counterfactuals without having to settle on which is 
ultimately to be reduced to which.  
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 The notion of an intervention does a lot of work for interventionists. In effect, it 
plays the role allotted to small miracles in the Lewisian semantics for non-back-
tracking counterfactuals (Lewis 1973a, 1979/1986), the role of specifying that the 
antecedent be realized in a way that does not ʻdrag alongʼ unwanted causal history. 
An intervention is a ʻcleanʼ alteration of the value of a particular variable that does 
not affect the values of upstream causal variables: for example, an intervention on 
the reading of a barometer leaves unchanged both the pressure in the room and the 
barometerʼs own causal origins. It is immediately apparent that a characterization 
like this will not issue in a reductive theory of causation, since the notion of an 
intervention (a specific type of alteration of a variable value) is explicitly causal3. 
Nonetheless, interventionists typically maintain that their account is still informative 
because it shows us how various distinct causal claims are conceptually connected to 
one another. The approach will deliver verdicts about specific causal dependencies 
once we have specified an appropriate causal model. 
 
In light of the close analogy between causation and grounding, if the non-
reductive interventionist approach is helpful for explicating causation then it ought 
also to be helpful for explicating grounding. By applying interventionism to 
grounding scenarios, we might hope to derive some informative results about the 
nature of grounding. That will be my approach in the rest of this paper. 
 
3. Grounding Models 
From an interventionist perspective, the counterfactual dependency judgments 
entailed by grounding claims will be underwritten by a particular grounding model. 
In a companion paper (A. Wilson MS) I give several examples of grounding models, 
making use of the flexibility of the structural-equations framework to capture cases 
including grounding by omission, grounding by prevention, grounding pre-emption 
and grounding overdetermination. For present purposes we need only see how the 
interventionist approach applies to straightforward cases of grounding, since even the 
simplest grounding models suffice to reveal counterpossible non-triviality when 
looked at through the interventionist lens. The models presented in this section will 
serve to introduce the systematic connection between structural-equation models and 
interventionist counterfactuals and to clarify the notion of a grounding intervention; 
and, in §4, the models will be used to frame my main argument concerning 
counterpossible non-triviality.  
                                                 
3 Reutlinger (2012) argues that the notion of an intervention can be dispensed with to deliver 
a bare counterfactual theory that yields truth-conditions for causal claims equivalent to those 
yielded by Woodwardʼs theory; nonetheless, the resulting theory still fails to be reductive 
since it relies on a primitive distinction between appropriate and inappropriate models. 
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Every structural-equations model, formally speaking, consists of a set of variables 
representing features of reality, a set of structural equations linking the values of the 
variables according to the causal/grounding structure of reality, and an assignment 
function specifying which values the variables actually take. We may think of each 
variable as a question, and of the possible values of each variable as the various 
possible answers to that question (Briggs 2012a). Variables may in general be either 
discrete (whether Socrates exists) or continuous (how tall Socrates is). The facts that 
stand in grounding relations, in this framework, are thus identified with question-
answer pairs: think of them, if you like, as ʻthe fact that answer A is the correct 
answer to question Qʼ. For yes/no questions, we conventionally assign a value of 1 
for ʻyesʼ and 0 for ʻnoʼ. 
 
The structural equations of a model are written in the form A=f(B,C, …). It is 
important to note that this ʻ=ʼ does not denote identity, or indeed any symmetric 
relation. Instead, according to interventionists it expresses the asymmetric 
counterfactual dependence of variable A on variables B, C, …. Accordingly,  each 
individual structural equation within a model encodes a set of counterfactuals of the 
form: if B, C, … were set to values b, c, … by an intervention, A would take value 
f(b,c,…). Complex structural-equations models encode many such sets of 
counterfactuals. The central role played by these counterfactuals in the 
interventionist framework is what marks it out as part of the broad tradition of 
counterfactual approaches to causation. For the standard philosophical account of 
interventionist counterfactuals, see Woodward (2003 p.59-61); for detailed 
explorations of their semantics, see Briggs (2012a) and Santorio (MS). 
 
The structural equations and assignment function of a structural-equations model 
may be represented by a directed graph with actual variable values at nodes. (The 
causal modelling literature, being oriented towards practical applications, tends to 
ignore possible cases of causal loops by requiring the graphs also to be acyclic.) Such 
graphical visualizations, while heuristically useful, leave out important aspects of the 
structural-equations models: the visualizations do not represent the alternative values 
that a variable could have taken, or the dependency relations between these 
unactualized variable values. Accordingly, many distinct causal models may 
correspond to a single directed acyclic graph, and we will also need to provide a full 
set of structural equations to properly characterize our grounding models. 
 
The simplest possible type of case of causation involves one fact being a sufficient 
cause of another:  
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Window 
Variables 
C: Whether Suzy throws the rock 
E: Whether the window smashes 
Structural Equations 
E=C 
Assignment 
 C=1; E=1 
Graphical Representation 
C=1 → E=1 
Models with exactly the same structure also describe the simplest possible cases of 
one fact being a full ground of another. All that changes is the variables involved. In 
one of the most notorious of all grounding cases, the existence of Socrates is taken to 
fully ground the existence of Singleton Socrates (the impure singleton set containing 
Socrates as a member). Singleton Socrates exists because Socrates does: 
Singleton 
C: Whether Socrates exists 
E: Whether Singleton Socrates exists 
Another classic application of grounding ideology is to the determinate/determinable 
relationship. According to the standard line of thought: being red is a way of being 
coloured, so a red brick gets to be coloured in virtue of being red. Accordingly the 
brick’s being red is taken to fully ground the brick’s being coloured. The brick is 
coloured because it is red: 
Colour 
C: Whether the brick is red 
E: Whether the brick is coloured 
 
 To draw conclusions about grounding from considering these grounding models, 
we must turn to interventionism’s distinctive twist: a systematic connection between 
structural-equations models and a special class of interventionist counterfactuals. The 
next section looks at the interventionist counterfactuals associated with grounding 
models, and shows that even the simplest grounding models encode non-trivial 
differences in truth-values amongst counterpossible counterfactuals. 
 
4. Interventionist Counterfactuals 
 Early counterfactual accounts of causation suffered from the problem of 
asymmetry: while causal dependence is (at least by and large) an asymmetric matter, 
often the counterfactuals used to analyse causation appear to hold true 
symmetrically. For example, while the judgment that had I not slipped I would not 
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have fallen might be taken to support my slip being a cause of my fall, it may be 
equally true in certain scenarios that had I not fallen I would not have slipped. 
(Perhaps I was walking on open ice, and the slightest slip would certainly have 
resulted in a fall.) But the fall does not cause the slip in those scenarios. In 
recognition of the problem of asymmetry, Lewis restricted his original counterfactual 
analysis of causation (Lewis 1973b/1986) so that only a special class of non-back-
tracking counterfactuals were sufficient (if true) for causal dependence to obtain. 
Unfortunately, Lewis never succeeded in specifying the class of non-back-tracking 
counterfactuals in a satisfactory and non-circular way (see Elga 2001 for discussion). 
 
 The appeal to structural-equation models provides interventionists with a 
distinctive solution to the problem of asymmetry. The interventionist account of 
causation uses structural-equations models to encode asymmetric patterns of 
counterfactuals of a special type: interventionist counterfactuals. These are 
counterfactuals with antecedents corresponding to combinations of interventions on 
model variable values and with consequents corresponding to combinations of model 
variable values. Our familiar causal locutions are then analyzed directly in terms of 
interventionist counterfactuals. True interventionist counterfactuals can suffice for 
relations of causal sufficiency or dependence of various kinds between the relevant 
variables; counterfactuals that are not interventionist counterfactuals do not suffice 
for causal relations of any kind. We can likewise understand our grounding models as 
encoding an asymmetric pattern of interventionist counterfactuals.  
  
 Starting with a grounding model, a clear distinction can be drawn between 
interventionist counterfactuals (those with antecedents specifying interventions on 
model variables and with consequents specifying values for model variables) and 
other counterfactuals. Recall the Singleton model from the previous section: 
Singleton 
Variables 
C: Whether Socrates exists 
E: Whether Singleton Socrates exists 
Structural Equations 
E=C 
Assignment 
 C=1; E=1 
Graphical Representation 
C=1 → E=1 
This grounding model, given an interventionist reading, encodes a range of 
interventionist counterfactuals. Their truth-values are determined by starting with 
the model, implementing the interventions specified in the antecedent on the actual 
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assignment of variable values, and then following up the downstream4 consequences 
of these interventions according to the structural equations of the model. The 
interventionist counterfactual is true if and only if this procedure yields an 
assignment of values to variables that verifies the consequent. So we have: 
CF1. If an intervention had prevented Socrates from existing, then Singleton 
Socrates would not have existed.  — True  
CF2. If an intervention had prevented Socrates from existing, then Singleton 
Socrates would have existed.  — False 
CF3. If an intervention had prevented Singleton Socrates from existing, then 
Socrates would not have existed.  — False 
CF4. If an intervention had prevented Singleton Socrates from existing, then 
Socrates would have existed.  — True 
CF1 and CF2 are not counterpossibles: there is nothing metaphysically impossible 
about the intervention that prevents Socrates’ existence5. However, evaluating the 
antecedents of CF3 and CF4 does take us to a metaphysically impossible assignment 
of values to variables. The intervention specified by their antecedents results in a 
situation in which Socrates exists but lacks a singleton set, and this requires breaking 
a metaphysically necessary connection between material objects and sets.  
 
Why does the intervention specified by the antecedent of CF3 and CF4 give rise 
to a metaphysically impossible scenario, when there are metaphysically possible ways 
for Singleton Socrates to fail to exist? The answer is that interventions 
characteristically alter the value of the target variable, but not via any of the 
pathways internal to the model. Rather, interventions involve the action of an 
external influence that is not explicitly represented by the model, and which severs 
some dependencies encoded in the structural equations of the model. In the Window 
case (see §3), intervening on whether the window breaks severs the connection 
expressed by the structural equation ʻE=Cʼ. If Suzy throws, but a freak gust of wind 
diverts her rock, then C=1 but E=0. The intervention therefore falsifies this material 
conditional: “if C takes value 1, then E takes value 1”. But the material conditionals 
associated with models of full grounding are intended to be necessary truths. On 
                                                 
4 ‘Downstream’ is to be understood as being fixed by the structural equations of the model. 
In the causal case, the downstream direction typically aligns with the direction of time 
(although time-travel scenarios, if possible, break that alignment). In the grounding case, the 
downstream direction typically runs from more fundamental to less fundamental (although 
grounding loops, if possible, break that alignment). Ultimately, which facts are in reality 
downstream of which depends on which model is appropriate; appropriateness is taken as 
primitive by interventionists, in accordance with their non-reductive orientation (see p.3). 
5 To simplify matters, I set aside necessitism (the view that everything is necessarily 
something). See Williamson (2013) and Stalnaker (2012) for discussion. 
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orthodox views of grounding, if C fully grounds E then C necessitates E.6 So any 
intervention on a variable that is fully grounded in some other model variables will 
falsify some necessarily true material conditional. Any interventionist counterfactual 
with an antecedent that specifies such an intervention will be a counterpossible. 
 
 Since this point is the core of my argument, it is worth working through in 
detail. Focus on the falsity of CF3 (“If an intervention had prevented Singleton 
Socrates from existing, then Socrates would not have existed”). This counterfactual is 
false, according to the grounding model in question, since the variable setting 
described in the consequent (i.e. C=0) is not the result of applying the intervention 
described in the antecedent (i.e. set E=0) to our grounding model. The intervention 
specified by the antecedent is on the variable E (whether Singleton Socrates exists), 
which is downstream of the variable C (whether Socrates exists) that has its value 
specified by the consequent. As a result, the antecedent intervention leaves the value 
of the consequent variable untouched, and the counterfactual comes out false. The 
falsity of CF3 stands alongside the truth of CF1 as a key part of what the Singleton 
model represents about the asymmetric grounding structure of the world. 
 
In the Window case, the analogue of CF3 is “if an intervention had prevented the 
window from smashing, then Suzy would not have thrown the rock”. Interventionists 
rely on the non-trivial falsity of this counterfactual in order to obtain the desired 
verdict that the smashing does not cause the throwing. It is not a counterpossible: 
there are plenty of metaphysically possible ways for the window to stay intact even if 
Suzy throws the rock. (Perhaps the freak gust blows, or Billy opens the window just 
in time.) But when grounding is concerned, interventions on any variables other than 
contingent variables with no variables upstream of them will involve falsifying one of 
the grounding model’s structural equations, resulting in metaphysically impossible 
combinations of variable values. The intervention specified in the antecedent of CF3 
and CF4 excises Singleton Socrates from the world, while leaving Socrates in place 
but lacking a singleton. It thereby breaks the connection captured by the equation 
E=C, and entails the falsity of the (putatively necessary) principle of impure set 
theory that for every concrete object there is a singleton set containing that object.  
                                                 
6 Parsons (1999) and Briggs (2012b) deny that truthmaking entails the corresponding 
necessitated material conditional; so if truthmaking is a kind of full grounding then they 
constitute exceptions to this rule. And Leuenberger (2014) and Skiles (forthcoming) argue 
directly against the claim that full grounds necessitate that which they ground.  However, 
these authors still grant that at least some cases of grounding do involve necessitation—
mathematical and logical cases, for example—and models of these cases will encode 
counterpossible interventionist grounding counterfactuals. 
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As a final illustration, consider the Colour case discussed in the previous section, 
in which a brick being coloured is grounded in its being red. Consider the analogue of 
interventionist counterfactual CF3: “If an intervention had prevented the brick from 
being coloured, then the brick would not have been red.” According to the Colour 
model, the variable E (whether the brick is coloured) is downstream of the variable 
C (whether the brick is red). So intervening on E holds C fixed, giving rise to a 
situation in which the brick is red but not coloured, and our interventionist 
counterfactual is a (false) counterpossible: the antecedent intervention falsifies the 
necessarily true material conditional ‘if the brick is red, then the brick is coloured’. 
Being metaphysically impossible, this intervention is of an unfamiliar sort—it is not 
a way in which you or I could go about preventing a brick from being coloured!—but 
the unfamiliarity of the intervention does not prevent us from assessing its 
counterfactual consequences. My central point stands: the interventionist approach 
to grounding reveals that cases of full ground place distinctive constraints on what 
counterfactually follows from certain specific impossible interventions.  
 
 To be clear: the argument of this section is not that the true interventionist 
counterfactuals, the truth of which supports positive grounding connections, are 
always counterpossibles. CF1 and CF2 have antecedents that specify a 
metaphysically possible intervention. But since the grounding dependency involved 
in Singleton is required to be one-way, the model must fix truth-values for CF3 and 
CF4 also—and these counterfactuals are counterpossibles. So non-trivial grounding 
models do generically involve non-trivial counterpossible truth and falsity.7  
 
5. Counterpossible Triviality 
Counterpossible counterfactuals pose a difficult philosophical puzzle. Familiar 
semantic accounts of counterfactuals in terms of possible worlds break down when 
applied to counterpossible counterfactuals, for obvious reasons; and non-trivial 
counterpossibles falsify some natural principles connecting counterfactuals with the 
logic of metaphysical modality (Williamson 2008). In the light of such problems, a 
popular and strikingly simple response has been to regard all counterpossible 
conditionals as trivially true. Our differential responses to counterpossibles can then 
be explained away on pragmatic grounds. Call this the conservative approach. 
 
                                                 
7 There may be some exceptions to this generic if there are cases of partial grounding without 
full grounding; Leuenberger (MS) argues for the possibility of such cases. I need not take a 
stand on their possibility here; my argument goes through for any non-trivial grounding 
model (that is, for any model that appropriately represents a case of full grounding). 
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David Lewis was a conservative: he described himself as “fairly content to let 
counterfactuals with impossible antecedents be vacuously true” (Lewis 1973 p.25), 
noting that this approach is enforced (at least for inconsistent antecedents) by the 
combination of ex falso quodlibet and the attractive thesis that counterfactuals where 
the antecedent logically implies the consequent are automatically true; though he 
also called these reasons “less than decisive” (ibid. p.25). Stalnaker (1996a) adopts a 
similar position, for similar reasons. Conservatism has also recently been fiercely 
defended by Timothy Williamson, who writes: 
The logic of quantifiers was confused and retarded for centuries by 
unwillingness to recognize vacuously true universal generalizations; we 
should not allow the logic of counterfactuals to be similarly confused by 
unwillingness to recognize vacuously true counterpossibles. 
Williamson (2008) p.175 
Adopting the conservative view trivializes the interventionist counterfactuals 
associated with cases of ground. If an intervention were to prevent there from being 
any sets, there would still be Socrates, right enough; but it is also true on the 
conservative view that, if an intervention were to prevent there from being any sets, 
then there would not be Socrates. Conservatism about counterpossible 
counterfactuals undermines the differences in truth-value between interventionist 
counterfactuals that are essential for providing structure to grounding models. 
 
Of course, not everyone agrees that counterpossible counterfactuals have trivial 
truth-conditions. I will use the term ʻliberalʼ to cover those philosophers, such as 
Priest, Nolan, Fine, Goodman, and Brogaard & Salerno, who affirm that there are 
some true counterpossibles as well as some false counterpossibles. Several advocates 
of this program (Nolan 1997, Goodman 2004, Priest 2005, Jago forthcoming) have 
developed a framework of sui generis impossible worlds to underwrite a familiar 
closeness-based semantics for assessing counterpossibles, while Restall (1997) 
proposes instead to reduce impossible worlds to sets of possible worlds. 
 
At this point we come to a parting of the ways. Consider the following argument 
against counterpossible triviality (similar arguments could be developed using any 
case of full grounding): 
1. The interventionist analysis of grounding is correct. (Premise)  
2. The fact that Socrates exists fully grounds the fact that Singleton Socrates 
exists, but not vice versa. (Premise.) 
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3. If the interventionist account of grounding is correct, then if A fully grounds 
B (but not vice versa) then an intervention on A would alter the truth-value 
of B, but not vice versa. (Definition of interventionism.) 
4. It is false that if an intervention had prevented Singleton Socrates from 
existing, then Socrates would not have existed. (From 1, 2, 3.) 
5. ʻIf an intervention had prevented Singleton Socrates from existing, then 
Socrates would not have existedʼ is a counterpossible. (Premise.) 
6. Not all counterpossibles are trivially true. (From 4, 5.) 
The interventionist treatment of grounding exposes a tension between the 
popular thesis that there are genuine cases of full grounding and the popular thesis 
that counterpossibles are trivially true. Sceptics about non-trivial counterpossibles 
who prize straightforward and elegant connections between metaphysical modality 
and the logic of counterfactuals will be driven to reject grounding as a useful notion 
in metaphysics. In contrast, friends of non-trivial counterpossibles may continue to 
countenance widespread grounding on an interventionist model. They can allow for 
non-trivial patterns of truth and falsity even amongst counterpossible interventionist 
counterfactuals, thereby recovering the desired patterns of grounding. 
 
 I will not try to adjudicate the dispute between conservatives and liberals here; it 
runs much too deep. Instead, I want to use the existence of this dispute to diagnose a 
potential route to scepticism about grounding. The argument given above provides a 
rationale for those suspicious of non-trivial counterpossibles to be suspicious of 
grounding, since it can be seen to carry non-trivial counterpossible commitments. It 
also provides a rationale for those suspicious of grounding to be suspicious of non-
trivial counterpossibles, since non-trivial counterpossibles threaten to let grounding 
in by the back door. While the former rationale is stronger than the latter—there 
could be various alternative reasons for rejecting the notion of grounding that keep 
the back door firmly closed8—the existence of these rationales suggests that we 
should expect a positive correlation between grounding scepticism and 
counterpossible trivialism. And, in my experience, philosophers do cleave in relatively 
orderly fashion along these lines. Liberals who are happy with non-trivial 
counterpossibles also tend to be happy with talk of grounding (Kit Fine, Daniel 
Nolan, Graham Priest and Jonathan Schaffer are paradigm examples), while 
                                                 
8 Hofweber (2009) and Daly (2012) offer one alternative reason for rejecting grounding talk: 
that it is unintelligible. My argument could be deployed to support their premise: if non-
trivial counterpossible truth and falsity is unintelligible, so is grounding. However, Daly and 
Hofweber take grounding to be unintelligible for more general reasons that could motivate a 
rejection of grounding even for those content with non-trivial counterfactual truth and falsity. 
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conservatives (amongst them David Lewis9, Robert Stalnaker10, Timothy 
Williamson11 and Jessica Wilson12) are suspicious both of non-trivial counterpossibles 
and of grounding. The interventionist approach to grounding permits an explanation 
of this sociological divide: grounding carries an implicit commitment to non-trivial 
counterpossible truth and falsity. 
 
In tracing suspicions about grounding to suspicions about counterpossible 
counterfactuals, I do not mean to ascribe to the metaphysics community at large the 
views that grounding should be given an interventionist analysis and that 
interventionist models of grounding encode non-trivial counterpossibles. These claims 
are, as far as I know, original to the present paper. However, it does seem plausible 
that philosophers working on grounding have recognized, more or less distinctly, that 
grounding claims are tied up with counterfactual thought that ranges beyond the 
metaphysically possible. For example, Jessica Wilson (2014) and Thomas Hofweber 
(2009) both note this feature of grounding while arguing that grounding does not 
reduce to counterfactual dependence. (It is evident from their discussions that they 
are envisaging only a reduction to non-counterpossible counterfactual dependence.) 
 
 An analogy may clarify the epistemic position that I seek to diagnose. Suppose, 
to adapt an example from Putnam (1962, p.660), that cats are expertly-disguised 
robots sent by aliens to keep an eye on us, and that no humans are aware of this 
fact. Should the true nature of cats be revealed, it would be misguided to use this to 
explain why some human (call him Steve) who dislikes robots also dislikes cats. 
Steve couldn’t have disliked cats on the basis that they were robots, because he had 
no idea that they were robots. But, as I see things, our epistemic position with 
respect to grounding and counterpossible non-triviality is more analogous to a 
scenario in which the cat-robots are not perfectly disguised, and in which Steve has 
                                                 
9 Lewis did not engage with questions about grounding, as he died before its recent rise to 
prominence. But in his formulations of metaphysical dependency theses—most notably his 
doctrine of Humean Supervenience (Lewis 1986 p.ix-xvi)—he uses only the purely modal 
notion of supervenience. And he is explicit that no stronger notion is required for reductionist 
projects: “If we limit ourselves to the question how mind finds a place in the world of physics, 
our work is done. Materialist supervenience offers a full answer.” (Lewis 1994 p.55). 
10 Discussing a conception of supervenience that is strongly reminiscent of grounding—“as 
some kind of substantive relation—some kind of metaphysical superglue” (Stalnaker 1996b 
p.235)—Stalnaker tells us “I am inclined to agree... that the more metaphysically extravagant 
interpretation of supervenience is obscurantist, perhaps incoherent...” (ibid. p.235). 
11 In correspondence, Williamson has indicated that he is sceptical that the notion of ground 
as currently used by metaphysicians can play any useful theoretical role. 
12 Wilson is a well-known critic of the notion of ground (J. Wilson 2014). In correspondence, 
Wilson has indicated that she is also inclined to think that counterpossible counterfactuals 
are irrelevant for metaphysics, being either trivially true or otherwise defective. 
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consequently sub-consciously or semi-consciously perceived regular robotic aspects to 
the cats’ behaviour. Disliking robots, he comes to dislike cats, even though he is not 
quite sure why; something in their behavior just freaks him out. When Steve 
discovers that cats are robots, he thinks to himself: “Ah! – this new information 
accounts for that strong feeling of mistrust I had about cats, on the source of which I 
couldn’t quite put my finger. But now it makes perfect sense – I dislike cats because 
cats are robots, and I was indistinctly picking up on that.” 
 
6. Conclusion 
 It is time to sum up. The interventionist approach to grounding provides a way 
to revive the spirit, if not the letter, of modal analyses of grounding: instead of 
analyzing grounding in terms of necessitated material conditions, we can analyze it in 
terms of subjunctive conditionals, using structural-equation models to encode 
asymmetric patterns of counterfactual dependence. The key is to adopt a theory of 
counterfactuals that allows for non-trivial counterpossible truth and falsity, which 
can accordingly underwrite the needed variation in truth-value amongst the 
counterpossible interventionist counterfactuals encoded in grounding models. 
 The argument of this paper has highlighted a divide that runs through 
contemporary metaphysics, between conservatives who reject counterpossible thought 
and liberals who endorse it. Recognizing this divide provides us with a new handle 
on recent controversies over grounding. The intelligibility of grounding rests on the 
intelligibility of non-trivial counterpossible truth and falsity. 13, 14 
                                                 
13 Krakauer (2012) gives an analysis of grounding that also makes use of counterpossible 
conditionals. However, Krakauer develops his analysis rather differently and does not identify 
the problematic interventionist counterfactuals (e.g. CF3, CF4) on which my argument turns. 
In future work I hope to make a detailed comparison between our approaches. 
14 For enlightening discussions of the material in this paper, I’m very grateful to Ralph 
Bader, Sam Baron, Elizabeth Barnes, Helen Beebee, Karen Bennett, Rachael Briggs, Ross 
Cameron, Vanessa Carr, Esa Diaz-León, Cian Dorr, Daniel Elstein, Nina Emery, Kit Fine, 
Ned Hall, Thomas Hofweber, Nicholas Jones, Luke Glynn, Carl Hoefer, Alex Kaiserman, 
Stephan Leuenberger, Dan López de Sa, Elizabeth Miller, Kristie Miller, James Norton, Josh 
Parsons, Martin Pickup, Oliver Pooley, Alex Reutlinger, Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, Paolo 
Santorio, Raul Saucedo, Jon Shaheen, Alex Skiles, Naomi Thompson, Jason Turner, Pekka 
Väyrynen, Robbie Williams, and Jessica Wilson, and questioners in Barcelona, Birmingham, 
Brisbane, Leeds, Newark, Oxford and Edinburgh. My particular thanks go to Jonathan 
Schaffer, who independently developed a very similar interventionist approach to grounding 
and who has since been unfailingly generous and helpful in correspondence. Schaffer’s own 
presentation of the approach (Schaffer 2016) does not draw attention to the ubiquity of 
counterpossibles such as CF3 and CF4, but we are in full agreement on the other main points 
above: the depth of the grounding-causation analogy, the intimate connection between 
grounding and counterfactuals, and the way in which the structural-equations formalism 
carries over to grounding. (For some points on which we do disagree, see A. Wilson (MS).) 
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